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10 Drought,  f l ight,  conf l ict:  “climate 
migration” as a driver for conf l ict?  
Christiane J.  Fröhlich 
A b s t r a c t  
So-called “climate migration”, i. e. human mobility following prolonged drought 
periods, floods, or other climate-related environmental changes, has been singled 
out as an important factor connecting climate change effects and (violent) conflict. 
However, the existing studies on this relationship do not offer a clear picture. Nev-
ertheless, Syria has evolved into a “show case study” for this assumed linear cau-
sality: A “century drought” and ensuing internal migration are seen as an untold 
prequel of the Syrian uprising. This alarmist, determinist, and simplifying image 
is questioned and reviewed in order to answer the following questions: Was the 
Syrian drought related to or caused by climate change? Which role, if any, did it 
play for internal migration in pre-revolutionary Syria? What do we know about 
“drought migrants” and their role in the Syrian uprising? The article summarizes 
available research and adds to it by way of interviews with Syrian refugees. 
KEYWORDS: Drought, climate migration, climate change, conflict, Syria. 
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I n t r o d u c t i o n  
The hypothetical connections between anthropogenic climate change, violent conflict, 
and migration have garnered a lot of attention over the years. The common argument 
is that in the absence of adequate adaptation measures, the impacts of climate change, 
such as droughts, storms, heatwaves, floods, and sea-level rise, can be expected to cre-
ate additional risks for livelihoods, especially among already poor and marginalized 
parts of a population. Such increased livelihood insecurity is then assumed to stimu-
late migratory movements to presumably safer or wealthier places (Abel et al. 2019), 
most obviously when areas become permanently uninhabitable, for instance due to 
sea-level rise (Klepp 2017; McNamara et al. 2016). Such migration processes are then 
often assumed to potentially fuel discontent and violence in receiving areas 
(Braithwaite et al. 2019; Ide 2015), especially when crossing from the Global South to 
the Global North (Ceccorulli and Labanca 2014). What is more, livelihood insecurity 
and resource scarcity are also hypothesized to result in higher inequalities and griev-
ances, and hence a higher risk of armed conflict (Hsiang et al. 2013; Burke et al. 2009). 
Further, researchers are concerned that climate change facilitates a deterioration of 
the governance capacities of formal and informal institutions (Gleditsch 2012; 
Scheffran et al. 2012). The potential resulting unrest is often assumed to trigger addi-
tional migration flows. However, there are few systematic studies assessing these dif-
ferent causalities and securitization processes (Raleigh 2010; Raleigh et al. 2010; Reu-
veny 2007, 2008; Oels 2012). 
This article singles out human mobility as a prominent assumed mediating fac-
tor between climate change on the one hand and conflict escalation on the other fo-
cusing on the Syrian case, which has become an often-cited case study of the climate 
change-migration-violence nexus. The debate on the relationship between the three 
phenomena is still not settled (Kelley et al. 2015; Selby et al. 2017; Ide 2018; Selby 
2019). Drawing on interviews conducted in September and October 2014 in the Jor-
danian refugee camps Azraq and Zaatari as well as the Northern Jordanian cities Ir-
bid and Ramtha, the paper reviews the assumed causalities between climate change 
and migration in the Syrian case.1 
                                                                          
1 In 30 semi-structured interviews with Syrian farming families from different governorates, I discussed local 
impacts of the drought, the extent and repercussions of internal migration, the role of migrants and non-
migrants in the Syrian uprising, and the overall role of climate change impacts for the political protests, 
among others. Interviewees included non-migrants who had worked with/employed migrants as well as (a 
fewer number of) migrants, wage workers and large-scale land owners, activists, and people who did not 
participate in the protests. I spoke to both male and female heads of households. 
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C l i m a t e  m i g r a n t s  a s  p r o t e s t o r s ?  T h e  c a s e  of  S y r i a 2 
The Syrian Arab Republic, as most of the Middle East and North Africa, has been suf-
fering from long-term environmental changes, which are likely to be linked to anthro-
pogenic climate change. In particular, an extended drought period from 2006 to 2009 
entailed consecutive crop failures in parts of the country, loss of livestock, and a no-
ticeable increase in internal migration (Selby et al. 2017; Ide 2018). For many commen-
tators, this complex concoction of circumstances partly explains the timing and inten-
sity of social upheaval in Syria (Werrell et al. 2015; Kelley et al. 2015; Bawden 2015; Fried-
man 2013). From the United States government (White House 2015) to the European 
Union (Juncker 2015), from US-American to European think tanks (Werrell et al. 2013; 
Rüttinger et al. 2015), this assumed prelude of the Syrian revolution is continuously 
gaining traction. 
Migration decisions, however, are complex and not determined by environmental 
factors alone. Scholarship has identified five main drivers for (internal and interna-
tional) human mobility (Black et al. 2011a, b), namely economic, political, demo-
graphic, social, and environmental factors, which are deeply interconnected and me-
diated through socially, politically, and economically determined institutions and 
structures. Migration also is not a new phenomenon in Syria. What is more, the secu-
ritization of (climate) migration needs to be critically assessed against the facts of 
global migration flows (Oels 2012). As mentioned above, migration is often seen as a 
security issue per se, especially with regard to migration to the Global North. With the 
impacts of climate change become increasingly visible, alarmist discourses about cli-
mate migrants are on the rise (Abel et al. 2019). However, it remains disputed how 
many people will leave their habitat due to climate change: So-called maximalists as-
sume a simple, direct relationship between migration and climate change and thus 
project comparatively large numbers. Minimalists, on the contrary, underscore the 
complex nature of migration decisions and stress the respective society’s vulnerability 
and adaptive capacity as major factors for reducing the expected number of climate 
migrants (Suhrke 1994; Castles 2002; Morrissey 2009; Gemenne 2011; Morrissey 2012). 
Moreover, orchestrating popular protest requires social networks built on trust and at 
least some kind of organizational structure (McAdam et al. 1996; Tarrow 2011; Diani 
and McAdam 2003a; Chesters and Welsh 2011). It remains unclear how new migrants, 
often living below the poverty line, can initiate large-scale, long-lasting popular upris-
ings, especially in repressive autocratic regimes like Syria. 
This paper analyses the complex migration decision-making in Syria before 2011. 
It concludes that while climate change effects in Syria are real, and were indeed one of 
several reasons for internal migration prior to the conflict, they were certainly not the 
                                                                          
2 The following is based on Fröhlich (2016). 
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only, let alone the main reason for the outbreak of the uprising. The paper interrogates 
the conditions for initiating social protest in autocratic regimes and complicates the 
relationship between climate change effects, internal migration, and conflict. 
E n v i r o n m e n t a l  d r i v e r s  
There is little doubt that climate change effects in Syria are real. In the last 20 years, 
ten of the driest 12 winters worldwide occurred in the countries surrounding the Med-
iterranean Sea (NOAA 2011; Hoerling et al. 2012). NOAA’s Earth System Research La-
boratory concludes that the magnitude and frequency of the drying is too great to be 
explained by natural variability alone. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that droughts 
and rainfall variability have been quite common in the region, as the instrumental rec-
ord shows. It is also not contested that internal migration following a prolonged 
drought period 2006–09 led to an increase in internal migration, especially from the 
Northern governorates to the South and the coast; the most commonly cited figure is 
that of 1.5 million for the period of the drought, but these are estimates only: exact 
numbers are scant. In 2010 alone, 50 000 families supposedly set off from the North 
(Worth 2010; Werrell et al. 2015; Gleick 2014) to the cities, mainly due to environmental 
drivers of migration, as the common argument has it. In order to better understand 
the drought’s impact on the scale and patterns of migration before 2010, however, a 
look at changes in natural resource availability, especially land and water, as well as 
intersections with other migration drivers seems useful. 
Syria is roughly as big as Spain, but only around 25 per cent of its 185 000 square 
kilometers are arable land – about the size of Switzerland. Most of Syrian land is 
desert, some is suitable for grazing, but less than 10 per cent of the surface is perma-
nent cropland.3 Between 2002 and 2008, Syria’s total water resources declined by 
half, partly through overuse and waste (Gleick 2014; Feitelson and Tubi 2017). In 2011, 
Syrians had access to just 325 m3 of water per capita from internal renewable fresh-
water resources, a number which has been declining for decades (in 1987, it was still 
627 m3)4, and which is a far cry from the UN scarcity level of 1000 m3. Ground water 
resources have long been overused, while Turkey and Iraq have gradually reduced 
the flow of the Euphrates since the mid-1980s. One interviewee from Deir az-Zur 
explained the following: “Of course there were changes when Hafiz al-Assad severed 
the connection to the river in 1986. Something happened between him and Turkey, 
                                                                          
3 Cf. http://sdwebx.worldbank.org/climateportalb/home.cfm?page=country_profile&CCode=SYR, last accessed 
10 December 2015. 
4 World Bank, “Renewable internal freshwater resources per capita (cubic meters)”, http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/ER.H2O.INTR.PC/countries/TN-LY-SY-1A-1W?display=graph, last accessed 10 December 2015. 
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so that he severed that connection. It was about fresh water and they ended our ac-
cess to the river. Before 1986, it was very good. The people lived, if not from the land, 
then from fish, from the water” (Interview Zaatari, 28.9.2014). More and more small-
scale landholders and agriculturalists depended on rain-fed agriculture, making 
them particularly vulnerable to weather extremes, drought and precipitation varia-
bility. Moreover, misuse and mismanagement of old and new irrigation systems 
gradually generated infertility in the soil, and unintended consequences of big dam 
projects caused negative impacts on the ecosystem. 
Overall, the limited availability of water, together with bad governance in the nat-
ural resource sector, resulted in only 13 500 square kilometers of land being irrigated 
in 2010, with agricultural production falling considerably (Polk 2013). At that time, the 
overall population had reached 21.5 million; equaling 0.86 hectare (ha) of arable land 
per person, of which only 0.062 ha could be irrigated in 2010 due to the drought. The 
FAO defines the absolute minimum of arable land to support one person to be 0.07 
hectares, assuming a largely vegetarian diet, no land degradation or water shortages, 
virtually no post-harvest waste, and farmers who know precisely when and how to 
plant, fertilize, irrigate etc. (FAO 1993). In the case of increased water scarcity, rainfall 
variability, and dust storms, the probability of failing crops and/or decreasing agricul-
tural production tends to rise. In such a context, 0.062 ha are a very small amount of 
land, especially in a country, in which a high percentage of livelihoods still depends on 
agriculture. In 2002, more than 30 per cent of Syrians had been employed in agricul-
ture; eight years later, this number had been halved in the overall workforce.5 
In a nutshell, environmental pressure indeed seems to have been rising, but was 
also exacerbated by unsustainable governance. Moreover, environmental drivers of-
ten operate through non-environmental causes (Hugo 2013). A migrant who moves 
because he can no longer sustain himself through agriculture as a result of drought 
and ensuing land degradation will often categorize the reasons for his movement as 
economic, not environmental. This entails what Castles (2002) has termed “concep-
tual fuzziness”. It is rather difficult to determine the extent to which the environ-
ment has played a role in a specific migration decision, unless migration has fol-
lowed a fast-onset environmental event like a flood. This paper therefore suggests 
that the outcomes of environmental drivers – migration, displacement and immo-
bility (Black et al. 2013) – are best understood as being embedded in their associated 
socio-economic, political, and demographic processes. 
                                                                          
5 World Bank, “World development indicators – employment in agriculture ( % of total employment)”, http://
data.wordbank.org/indicator/sL.AGr.empL.Zs/countries/1W-LY-tn-eG-sY?display=graph, last accessed 10 De-
cember 2015. 
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E co n o m i c  d r i v e r s  
Economy-related phenomena have substantial effects on migration decisions. The 
term economic drivers refers to differences between income levels in the origin and 
destination areas as well as to income variability in the originating areas (Lilleør and 
Van den Broeck 2011). Economic hardships like unemployment and poverty are among 
the most prominent examples. According to a study by the European University Insti-
tute (Aïta 2009), which critically assesses official Syrian data sets as well as data gath-
ered by international bodies like the UN and the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO), the Syrian state only created around 36 000 new jobs per year between 2001 and 
2007, with the agricultural sector losing 69 000 per annum (Aïta 2009, p. 5). At the same 
time, Aïta estimates the overall unemployment rate in Syria to be 30.3 per cent in 2007 
(including Palestinians, non-citizen Kurds and Iraqi immigrants), translating into the 
need to create 353 000 jobs per year if the unemployment rate were to drop to 11 % by 
2015 (Aïta 2009, p. 22). The government’s 10th five-year-plan had been to reach 8 % un-
employment by 2010 (State Planning Commission 2005). 
Thus, employment seems to have been a very serious issue in the Syrian economy 
long before the drought began. Modernization, rapid de-peasantization and slow re-
placement of agricultural employment with waged work in industry or services in the 
formal sector had taken their toll on both rural and urban environments. While the loss 
of working-age population to urban spaces had slowed down productivity in rural ar-
eas, production in urban areas did not rise fast enough for a sustainable urbanization. 
Referring to Dar`a, where he worked in the early 2000s, a farmer from Deir az-Zur felt 
that, “Young people like me just wanted to work. They wanted to live. We had nothing 
to do and were smoking the whole day” (Interview Zaatari 28.9.2014). 
Macro-economic policies of the Syrian government, which for decades had reg-
ulated agricultural crops, served as another economic push factor. The government’s 
numerous five-year and annual production plans had specified areas for crops, the 
types of crops to be planted as well as crop rotation patterns, effectively imposing a 
state-led system on the agricultural sector, beginning in the mid-20th century. This 
agricultural policy was defined by subsidies for farm inputs and fuels, especially for 
strategic crops such as wheat, cotton, and barley. A report by Olivier de Schutter, the 
Special Rapporteur for the Right to Food to the UN, explains this with the national 
goal of reaching self-sufficiency of main staples in order to achieve food security (De 
Schutter 2011, p. 15). Ensuing changes in traditional land and agricultural regimes 
had a detrimental impact on both the productivity in general and the income of al-
ready marginalized parts of the population, like small-scale landowners. At the same 
time, state-led structures introduced strong dependencies into the agricultural sec-
tor that were to become liabilities when Bashar al-Assad started to deregulate the 
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Syrian economy into what the 10th five-year-plan calls “an open competitive econ-
omy”6. 
Bashar al-Assad began his first term in 2000 with a speech focusing on reform 
as his vision for Syria’s further development, and started out addressing the numer-
ous challenges facing Syria by introducing political, economic, and administrative 
reforms. Overall, this “fresh start” was met with hope and enthusiasm by the Syrian 
population, but even more by outside observers who especially applauded the neolib-
eral deregulatory plans of the new government. However, the reforms were half-
hearted at best: Bashar al-Assad introduced economic reforms that promoted better 
tax collection and the reduction of subsidies but failed to address the endemic cor-
ruption and the lack of public accountability. While the limited economic reforms 
are considered responsible for the improvement in growth rates as well as for finding 
a substitute for decreasing oil revenues (see below), they did not create a diverse and 
sustainable economy, which would have been necessary to address the above-men-
tioned deficiencies in the labor market. 
Moreover, an economy that had been based on rents from the oil sector started 
to give way to demographic pressures, a decrease in oil-production, depleting oil re-
serves, and economic stagnation. These led to an overall decreasing standard of liv-
ing. Syria’s oil resources (conventional production), which had peaked in 1996, began 
to place a pronounced and continuous strain on the Syrian economy since the early 
2000s. The country’s oil production rate plummeted from approximately 580 000 
barrels a day in 19967 to around 369 000 barrels per day in 20078. Profits from this 
sector continuously decreased and added to the fiscal deficit, leading to a cut in fuel 
subsidies in May 2008 – at that time consuming 15 per cent of the Syrian GDP9. The 
price of petrol tripled (some say quadrupled) overnight, amplifying the pressure on 
food prices. Since fuel is required to operate water pumps, the rising petrol price led 
to a rise in water prices, which in turn impacted food prices. However, the drought 
had already begun to take its toll, adding to a rather strained situation in the food 
market and the water sector, to say the very least. These economic factors contrib-
uted to more and more Syrians needing to diversify their income, often necessitating 
migration from rural areas to the cities. 
                                                                          
6 Cf. http://planning.gov.sy/en_index.php?act=552&cat=172, last accessed 10 December 2015. 
7 Equalling approximately 81.2 kilotons per day, see International Energy Agency (IEA), http://www.iea.org/statistics/
statisticssearch/report/?year=1996&country=SYRIA&product=Balances, last accessed 10 December 2015. 
8 Equalling approximately 51,7 kilotons per day, see International Energy Agency (IEA) http://www.iea.org/statistics/
statisticssearch/report/?country=SYRIA&product=balances&year=2007, last accessed 10 December 2015. 
9 Cf. http://www.irinnews.org/report/79006/syria-bread-subsidies-under-threat-as-drought-hits-wheat-produc
tion, last accessed 10 December 2015. 
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S o c io - p o l it ic a l  a n d  d e m og r a p h ic  d r iv e r s  
Among the most prominent socio-political drivers of migration are political violence, 
war, discrimination, and persecution. Not unlike other authoritarian states, Syria un-
der Assad rule endorsed the simple formula “loyalty for patronage” (Ghrawi 2015). The 
rule of law was ambivalent, state institutions were characterized by manipulation and 
poor performance, the business environment was extremely fragile, corruption 
abounded, and Syrian citizens had little to no avenue to participate in political deci-
sion-making processes. Power and wealth were being distributed along highly infor-
mal but extremely resilient patronage networks. Nonetheless, the decade-old strategy 
of repressing those who advocated taghyir (change), while at the same time attempting 
to bind those advocating islah (reform) in patronage networks, began to crumble. 
Bashar al-Assad’s applauded state reforms quickly faced resistance from the 
governing elite and other stakeholders, the so-called “crony capitalists”, who were 
unwilling to give up privileges. Administrative reforms proved difficult as they 
threatened the established balance of power. They were soon reduced to limited im-
provement of services without tackling the public administration’s main deficien-
cies. Where reform had taken place, it did not reach far enough into the rural spaces 
or urban peripheries. In fact, urban centers such as Damascus and Aleppo had lost 
touch with the rural areas that dominate the rest of the country, resulting in policies 
that increasingly marginalized the rural population, further contributing to its hard-
ships. The social contract between government and population began to erode, with 
socio-political grievances intensifying and calls for change growing louder. In pre-
revolutionary Syria, policy incentives such as changes in land ownership regulations 
also played a part in driving people to leave, as well as the search for educational op-
portunities and obligations to kin. 
With the effects of the war in Iraq, the country also began to experience a grad-
ual islamization. Hoping to contain the rising Islamist movement, Bashar al-Assad 
sponsored various Sufi brotherhoods and established direct contact with the illegal 
Muslim Brotherhood, hoping to curb jihadi influence in the country. Yet, insurgents 
kept infiltrating from Iraq, as became evident in the violent emergence of factions 
such as Jund al-Sham and Fatah al-Islam. Assad’s foreign policy mistakes in Iraq and 
Lebanon, moreover, set off severe Western diplomatic retaliation and culminated in 
the collapse of the Syrian hegemony in Lebanon, depriving Syria of billions of dollars 
in annual revenue, adding to the critical situation on the labor market as well as the 
difficult economic situation. 
Finally, demographic drivers include population density and structure, for in-
stance the pressures exerted by a “youth bulge” (Fuller 2004; Urdal 2006), an unusu-
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ally large percentage of young people among the overall population. Syria’s popula-
tion growth was estimated at around 2.45 % per year in the pre-war years (Aïta 2009, 
p. 14). Before the uprising, the growth rate of the working-age population was higher 
than 4 % per annum (ibid). It is not surprising that the working-age population 
growth rate was higher in urban areas due to increasing rural to urban migration 
and the influx of Iraqi refugees (Hoffmann 2016), which these data take into account. 
Young age groups (15–25) constituted the majority of new job seekers in the Syrian 
labor market. Between 1998 and 2002, over 200 000 people entered the job market 
every year. By the 2000s, Syria was facing its largest growth rates of labor supply as 
a result of the coming of age of the children of the 1980s, a baby boom period, and 
their ensuing arrival in the job market. The influx of one and a half million Iraqis 
after the war began in 2003 (Hoffmann 2016) as well as the return of hundreds of 
thousands of Syrian circular workers from Lebanon from 2005 onwards (Fargues 
2009) also affected labor supply and the overall labor market structures in Syria. Be-
ginning in the mid-1970s, many, mostly low skilled Syrians had emigrated to Leba-
non, where the civil war had created labor shortages. This emigration continued un-
til 2005 when the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri was assassinated and 
Assad withdrew his army, leading to a deterioration of the already precarious living 
conditions of Syrian workers in Lebanon (Chalcraft 2008). 
P r e - e s t a b l i s h e d  m i g r a t i o n  c o r r i d o r s  
While environmental drivers for migration certainly existed in pre-revolutionary 
Syria, they were embedded in a complex economic, social, political, and demo-
graphic context that heavily influenced migration decisions. Out-migration to Leb-
anon, Jordan, and the Gulf was a common practice. More significantly, internal mi-
gration was by no means a new phenomenon in Syria (Khawaja 2002). Circular, sea-
sonal migration had been quite common for decades, especially since landlessness 
in Syria had been growing continuously despite attempts to curb its effects by means 
of redistributive land reform and public land distribution since the 1950s. Nearly half 
of Syria’s approximately 20 million residents (including Palestinians and Iraqis) lived 
in rural areas before the outbreak of the current civil war. Bashar al-Assad’s afore-
mentioned reforms favored large-scale land owners over small-scale farmers or 
sharecroppers, making the landless the weakest link in the agricultural labor chain. 
It is specifically the landless who were under high pressure to diversify their income. 
Over the years, seasonal migration became a common livelihood strategy. 
Single males from the Northern governorates of Deir az-Zur, Raqa, and 
Hasakah usually spent the summer season working on agricultural projects in the 
South until autumn when they would return. A Bedouin interviewee from Deir az-
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Zur, who had to migrate to Dar`a in 2000 because his land was confiscated by the 
government due to political repression and prosecution, described the process as fol-
lows: “We had been employing people who ploughed the land for us. Then it was the 
other way around, we ploughed for other people” (Interview Zaatari 28.9.2014). 
With the beginning of the drought, however, the number of migrants began to 
rise and whole families began to migrate mostly from the North towards the South 
and West of the country. One of the farmers I interviewed from Dar`a governorate, 
which became a receiving area, explained the following: 
CF:  Did you work with migrants? 
I:  Yes, they came to us [to work in agriculture]. Most came from Deir az-Zur, 
some also from Hama. 
CF:  Did the number of migrants change? 
I:  It grew. They had a drought in their area, that’s why. 
CF:  When did it begin to increase? 
I:  From 2005 onwards. 
CF:  Did they live on the land? Did they bring the whole families or was it just 
adults? 
I:  They came as whole families and lived in tents. They came to the areas 
where agricultural projects were run, worked there, and then went back 
home. For instance, they lived behind our house and got water and elec-
tricity from us. They also got food and water from us. 
CF:  Do you remember how much they got paid? 
I:  It varied between 40 and 100 Lira per hour [100 Syrian Lira equaled about 2 
US Dollars before the war]. Usually between 40 and 60 Lira, sometimes up 
to 80 Lira. (Interview Zaatari, 6.10.2014). 
The material I gathered contradicts the common assumption that migration patterns 
in Syria were predominantly rural to urban. It therefore challenges the idea that mi-
grants necessarily placed great strain on already pressured urban populations and 
thereby contributed to or even single-handedly created the basis for the imminent pop-
ular uprising (Werrell et al. 2015). It is, of course, true that those who did not want or 
were not able to work in agriculture would mostly migrate from rural to urban areas; 
they were often better educated than the day workers in the agricultural projects. As 
one interviewee from Raqqa explained:  
There were young people who left their parents to look for work. It was particularly young 
people with degrees like doctors and teachers. Some were also blacksmiths or car me-
chanics and went to Damascus, because it is bigger, or to another place (Interview Azraq, 
9.10.2014).  
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Many others, however, would follow established “migration corridors” to rural areas 
(Özden and Schiff 2007, p. 40f), which had developed over decades. Those involved less 
transaction costs than non-linear moves, or what is known as “chain migration”, to 
new destinations. 
As this section shows, migration decisions are complex and influenced by sev-
eral inter-related factors that create conceptual fuzziness. We need to unpack these 
complexities to understand the impact of environmental change on human mobility 
and the relationship between internal migration movements and social upheaval. 
M i g r a n t s  a s  p r o t e s t e r s ?  
Could the internal migrants have contributed to the outbreak of the Syrian uprising in 
Dar`a in March 2011? One way of answering this question is through social movement 
theory, which sees social networks as the prime mode of organization for collective ac-
tion – with formal networks gradually substituted by less formal networks on a more 
grassroots, interpersonal level (McAdam et al. 1996; Tarrow 2011; Chesters and Welsh 
2011; Diani and McAdam 2003b). Thus, social networks form the basis of social move-
ments. Consequently, the protests in Dar`a must have been built on at least loosely or-
ganized social networks and its initiators must have been embedded in them. 
But how does a network of interpersonal relations evolve into collective action? For 
this, the role of trust is key: according to Niklas Luhmann, trust is what makes collec-
tive life possible (Luhmann 1988, p. 97). Trust is also a prerequisite to building a com-
mon identity, which in turn is the basis for any social movement. Thus, in order to 
achieve collective action, individuals have to come together expecting that they will 
protect and promote each other’s interests in unforeseen circumstances with a com-
mon goal. In other words, they need to trust each other. This is particularly true, even 
existential, in an autocratic, extremely repressive state like Syria. As one of my inter-
viewees warned: “The state says: Do what you want. But do not talk about politics and 
keep away from it” (Interview Zaatari, 6.10.2014). Another common description of the 
overall living conditions within Syria before the revolution was the image of “the walls 
having ears”. It is common knowledge that the Syrian government had threatened to 
respond to verbal or physical opposition with brutal force; historical precedents like the 
protests in Hama 1982 provided an idea of what that may look like. It was extremely 
dangerous and risky, therefore, to protest against the Syrian government. The ques-
tion is how likely it is that migrants, who often lived below the poverty line, could have 
built the trust necessary to mobilize a social movement under such circumstances. 
How did a large group of people whose identities and daily lives were forcefully ori-
ented towards the private, the personal, and the mundane, decide to participate in col-
lective action? Which role did migrants play in this mobilization process? 
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I suggest we answer these questions by unpacking three key possibilities. The first 
is “opportunity”, the emergence of a particular situation, in which it appears feasible 
to achieve meaningful change through collective action. This condition was fulfilled by 
the Arab revolutions that preceded the Syrian one, namely in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, 
and Yemen. They demonstrated the demise of autocratic regimes and the triumph of 
civil opposition. Information about these developments was available through tradi-
tional and new media and through social ties between the Syrian population and the 
societies affected by the Arab Spring. In this sense, the opportunity existed for Syrian 
internal migrants to rebel, as it seemed possible that an uprising in Syria could be as 
successful as it had been in comparable autocratic states like Egypt. 
The second issue is what Doug McAdam has termed “threat” (McAdam 1999; Tilly 
and Tarrow 2012). Disadvantaged and power-deprived people usually live their lives 
“within a habituated framework of subordination” (Flacks 2004, p. 148). “In Syria, you 
have to rely on yourself,” one interviewee from Ramtha asserted (Interview 10.10.14). 
Another from Dar`a said: “Generally speaking, our village was isolated. Neither the 
state came close to us, nor did we come close to the state. Everyone focused on their 
own business” (Interview Zaatari, 3.10.14). To illustrate the government’s practices of 
subordination, one interviewee from Deir Baba (Homs Governorate) related what hap-
pened one day when he went to the traffic bureau to release a friend’s clamped car. A 
police officer asked him where he was going and told him to leave. He said he was quite 
upset by this and asked why the officer was talking to him in that hostile manner. “I 
told him I usually come here. I said that I was not coming to his father’s house, was I? 
It is a government institution. They imprisoned me, I “kissed his beard” and slaugh-
tered a sheep until the issue was solved.” The interviewee, conveying the exaggerated 
repercussions of life in Syria, came to the conclusion that “one, who said one word, was 
imprisoned for life” (Interview Zaatari, 3.10.14). 
Such habitually subordinated people become ready for collective action not only 
because they consider themselves unfree or deprived – this is not more than their 
day-to-day life for them. They rather mobilize because they share “the perception of 
a specific threat to their accustomed lifeways” (Flacks 2004, p. 148). Importantly, this 
perception of threat must be shared and the source of the threat needs to be identi-
fied as one specific human actor, as opposed to a natural event (Flacks 2004, p. 148)10. 
In the case of Syria, the different socio-political, demographic, and economic pres-
sures outlined above resulted in the common view that life as it had been under the 
rule of Hafiz al-Assad, authoritarian and repressive as it may have been, had come 
to be threatened by Bashar al-Assad’s rule. 
                                                                          
10 Nevertheless, social movement theory does not have an adequate answer to the question as to when the 
reaction to threats and repression turns from submission into defiance and open opposition (Davenport et 
al. 2004; Earl 2011; Pierskalla 2010). 
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The third issue is “liberation”. There are times in which a large group of people 
who share a certain way of life may turn to collective action to achieve new living 
conditions rather than defending the existing ones. In this case, collective action 
aims at rejecting and overturning established frameworks of identity, achieving 
rights hitherto denied, and voicing demands for equal treatment, dignity, and the 
ability to determine one’s own life (Flacks 2004, p. 149). This was certainly the case in 
Syria where demonstrators from the beginning and to this day have demanded free-
dom and dignity. As Richard Flacks argues, 
Liberatory perspectives arise among groups of people who share a condition of subordi-
nation, disadvantage, or stigma over which they have little or no individual control. Such 
subordination, based on race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, physical handicap, 
or any other “ascribed” trait, tends to be regarded in the dominant culture as a normal, 
taken-for-granted feature of everyday life. Those who are so subordinated have typically 
accommodated to their situation for generations, seeming to reproduce in their own con-
formity the conditions of their oppression. (Flacks 2004, p. 149) 
Leenders (2013) and Gerlach (2015) both cite a story about the immediate causes of 
the Syrian revolution. Two women from different Dar`a clans had been arrested and 
abused by authorities. This was, as the story goes, followed by anti-regime graffiti, 
which had been drawn by 15 school children in their defense. The children were sub-
sequently arrested and tortured. Attempts to mediate their release were met by re-
jection and insult. The local security chief, Atef Najeeb, shockingly suggested 
“sending local women to conceive some new kids [to replace the arrested ones]” 
(Leenders 2013, p. 279). Consequently, the people of Dar`a rallied in protest and de-
fiance, purportedly shouting “to hell with you” to security forces who opened fire. It 
can be argued that the people of Dar`a collectively identified a common threat, which 
became the basis for collective action to achieve liberation from it. The shared every-
day life provided space to develop both trust and a common language of oppression; 
in short: a shared sense of identity. 
Social movement theory considers social networks to be crucial for the mobili-
zation of collective action, especially in the context of seemingly insurmountable ob-
stacles (Diani and McAdam 2003b; McAdam et al. 2001; Einwohner and Maher 2011). 
Dar`a’s local society was characterized by “dense, interlinked social networks affect-
ing social, economic, and cultural life. These networks informed, motivated and en-
abled unprecedented mobilization […]” (Leenders 2013, p. 277). Leenders particularly 
stresses the role of Dar`a’s family clan structure in mediating social and economic 
cross-border ties beyond Syria. These include criminal networks as well as circular 
labor migration to Lebanon, Jordan, and the Gulf. Such elaborate and trust-based 
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social networks “link[ed] family or clan members, traders, money exchangers, 
smugglers, truck drivers, taxi drivers and bahara [‘sailors’, informal taxis transport-
ing people and smuggled goods], and corrupt customs officials” (Leenders 2013, p. 
278). While social networks enabled mobilization of liberation movements, however, 
the cost of the protests was too high for many people. “Of course I believed in the 
protests,” one interviewee from Dar`a exclaimed. “But we are very poor. People like 
us have been hit [by the revolution] and died. We went to rack and ruins. We, the 
poor people, suffered most. Whether Bashar al-Assad stays or goes does not matter” 
(Interview Zaatari, 3.10.14). 
Leender’s and others’ analysis of social movement theory – and the role of trust 
and shared identity – raises the question about migrants’ conditions of involvement. 
I suggest that migrants could not have achieved a common identity with the people 
from Dar`a, and thus could not have orchestrated political demonstrations of this 
magnitude and scale. While many migrants came regularly, they only spent some 
time of the year in and around the city. Even when numbers rose and migrants began 
to stay in and around Dar`a permanently, they did not integrate meaningfully with 
the local populace, and did not identify as Dar`awis. This is indicated both by the way 
in which locals referred to the migrants – as people outside of the community, as 
different and alien – and the way migrants themselves spoke about their lives there. 
The migrants were clearly a group of outsiders according to social identity theory 
(Tajfel and Turner 1986), as confirmed by the following farmer from Dar`a who had 
worked with migrants and was familiar with their conditions: “They came from the 
North, from Hasakah, and this region. Their number increased. In some villages, 
there were more migrants than locals. They lived in tents. They could be found eve-
rywhere and they worked in all [agricultural] projects. They had a difficult life, no 
assistance, and lived in tents. They had nothing to do with politics. They went to 
work and back home” (Interview Zaatari, 30.12.2014). 
If migrants were not the initiators of the protests, it is relevant to ask whether 
they sympathized or even took part in the uprising in Dar`a. After all, outsiders may 
have recognized their own longstanding grievances in the claims made by the local 
protesters. They may have subsequently joined the uprising and contributed to its 
diffusion and enduring strength. My research indicates that migrants, if they joined 
the protests at all, did so in their home governorates and not in the areas they mi-
grated to. In fact, the Dar`awis I interviewed in Jordan were divided between two 
positions. Some saw migrants as passive outsiders who were incapable of protesting 
due to their poor conditions. One interviewee from Dar`a pointed out that “in the 
first year some of the muhajirin (migrants) stayed. But when the troubles grew, they 
left” (Interview Ramtha, 10.10.2014). Another stated, “they left at the beginning of the 
demonstrations” (Interview Zaatari, 7.1.2015). Other more skeptical interviewees 
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deemed the migrants to be suspicious pro-regime agents who were against the pro-
tests, an aspect that underlines the lack of trust between Dar`awis and migrants. 
“They were all pro-Assad”, one interviewee insisted. “When the troubles started, they 
shouted pro Assad slogans. Even though they were poor people. Of 100, maybe ten 
are not pro Assad. They loved him, because many of them and their friends and fam-
ilies were in the army” (Interview Zaatari, 6.10.14). While the three conditions for 
collective action, opportunity, threat, and liberation, did exist in settings such as 
Dar`a prior to the Syrian uprising, it was not the (climate) migrants who initiated 
the protests. My data suggest that the migrants were too marginalized and outside 
of the strong Dar`awi identity to be able to initiate any social action. 
C o n c l u d i n g  r e m a r k s  
This article shows that environmental factors were only one and certainly not the de-
cisive element of individual migration decisions made in pre-revolutionary Syria. 
While it is true that climate change has had and will continue to have potentially ad-
verse effects on Syria and the whole Middle Eastern region, I have argued here that 
orchestrating a protest of the scale, intensity, and permanence of the one in Dar`a 
was well beyond the climate migrants’ social capacities and resources. In line with 
this, the majority of my interviewees considered the protests to be a reaction to state 
repression and mismanagement. Seeing the drought hit the Northern governorates, 
seeing the numbers of migrants on their agricultural production sites increase, and 
seeing men, women, and children work on the fields for very low wages only added 
to their sense of the increasing decline of the social contract between the government 
and the population. As one interviewee put it, 
When Bashar came to power, the differences and the gap [between rich and poor] became 
very big. An employee received thirty thousand a month, while a worker only received 
four or five hundred Lira per month. Only employees received raises, normal workers 
received no subsidies at all. I said that the country would collapse if it were ruled by chil-
dren. Bashar was only 33 years old. He had no wisdom and no leadership. He had a weak 
personality (Interview Zaatari, 3.1.2015). 
As this article demonstrates, connecting the Syrian uprising to climate change via 
migration is walking a thin line between the noble goal to raise awareness for the 
potentially severe and adverse effects of climate change on social systems in the hope 
of engendering an overdue policy shift to save the planet on the one hand, and the 
risk of absolving the Syrian regime from its responsibility for the unmitigated effects 
of the drought and of fueling discourses of re-nationalization and walling-off as well 
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as anti-immigration sentiments on the other. This needs to be reflected in all at-
tempts to rebuild Syria, as both large migration flows and climate change impacts 
are likely to continue to affect the Middle East. 
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